Research Workshop: "Neural Representations and Indeterminacies in Practice"

Caitlin Mace (Pitt HPS)

Thursday, May 22nd, 2025 (11:10–12:00 PM) | English (Building 22) Room 0315

Abstract:

‘Representation’ expresses a foundational concept in the sciences of the mind. But little about this concept, aside from its pervasive explanatory role, is well understood. Insofar as we might want to invoke representations in our explanations of perception, memory, cognition, and behavior, examining how researchers discover representations will better position us for evaluating those explanations. I investigate better and worse ways that neuroscientists postulate neural representations as part of an epistemology of neuroscientific practice. The framing allows me to focus on the inferences that neuroscientists make from experiments and other empirical studies to claims that there are neural representations. Neuroscientists grapple with indeterminacies of three different aspects of representations in their practices: indeterminacies of content, vehicle, and functions. Indeterminate things are not quantifiable, operationalizable, or testable, so scientists need a means to resolve such indeterminacies. I identify three inferences that neuroscientists use to putatively resolve indeterminacies for representational contents, vehicles, and functions. My investigation provides a possible upshot for metaphysics and philosophical theorizing about representations that aims to be continuous with natural science.

 

Bio: 

My current interests are primarily in philosophy of neuroscience and neurobiology, such as issues regarding reduction and explanation.  I am especially interested in theoretical problem-solving that researchers working in these areas also consider important, such as, for example, understanding the form and function of neuronal ensembles. Aside from this focus, I am interested in related areas of philosophy of science—like philosophy in biology, philosophy of medicine, and philosophy of cognitive science--and work on some issues in general philosophy—for example, philosophy of memory and know-how. Before coming to Pitt, I earned a B.A. in psychology with a minor in ethics and values from what is now Cal Poly Humboldt and an M.A. in philosophy from California State Univerity, Long Beach. My thesis work at CSU, Long Beach examined ruthless reductionist and new mechanist characterizations of neuroscience through a case study on optogenetics research on memory engrams.